TRADOC PAMPHLET 525-200-2

EARLY ENTRY LETHALITY AND SURVIVABILITY

US ARMY BATTLE DYNAMIC CONCEPT

1 MARCH 1994

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FOREWORD

The changing world environment has resulted in a change in the National Military Strategy (NMS). This has led to a new visionary concept for the Army of the Twenty-First Century, "Future Full Dimensional Operations," (December 1993) This vision incorporates the changes in threat, advances in technology, the adoption of a power projection strategy and corresponding changes in the conduct of battle. These changes, combined with an understanding of history, influence a new doctrine—a doctrine for Full Dimensional Operations. While the driving forces behind change will continue to be dynamic, the fundamental character of war and its human dimensions, the moral domain, will remain unchanged.

Early entry forces must possess capabilities to deploy rapidly, enter the operational area, secure the lodgement and either immediately have decisive effect or create conditions for the arrival of substantial follow-on forces that then conduct decisive operations. Early entry forces must consist of lethal and survivable units tailored to support or carry out the operational intent of the Joint Force Commander (JFC). Early entry operations is highly situational dependent and may occur across the range of military operations. There are three types of early entry operations: unopposed entry when no combat is taking place, unopposed entry under combat conditions, and forcible entry.

Force projection Army requires deployable, lethal, and survivable "first to fight" forces.

—Deployabiltiy of early entry forces is based on a number factors, among which are training and readiness, equipment characteristics, proximity to ports of embarkation, and force design that facilitates force tailoring during projection of U.S. forces.

—Lethality involves more than simply maneuver and the application of firepower. Lethality is obtained from the synergism of force agility, technology superior weapons, sound doctrine and realistic training emphasizing the integration and synchronization of total force capabilities to achieve maximum combat power.

—Early entry forces, to remain survivable, must have the capability to rapidly expand battle space in all dimensions, including time, against a potentially formidable armored force. To help achieve this, rapid joint force projection capability synchronization is required to maintain defense against enemy tactical ballistic missiles, achieve local air superiority, and rapidly secure lines of communication (LOCs).

—The nature of the early entry logistical challenge in support of JFC's concept of operations will vary with the size of the early entry force, the maturity of the theater, the availability of the in-theater stockage and Host Nation Support (HNS) capabilities. Early entry operations may require the ability to leverage space systems, develop forward support bases, intermediate staging bases and/or a lodgement in the theater with its associated over-the-shore or air flow requirements.



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Military Operations

EARLY ENTRY LETHALITY AND SURVIVABILITY BATTLE DYNAMIC CONCEPT

Summary. This concept serves as the basis for developing doctrine, leader development, organizations, and materiel changes focused on soldiers (DTLOMS) requirements and solutions for early entry operations. It provides the framework to describe early entry operations and required capabilities prescribed for a force projection Army.

Applicability. The concept applies to all TRADOC activities which develop DTLOM requirements.

Suggested improvements. The proponent of this pamphlet is the Deputy Chief of Staff for Combat Developments. Send comments and suggested improvements on DA Form 2028 (Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms) through channels to Commander, TRADOC, ATTN: ATCD-P, Fort Monroe, VA 23651-5000. Suggestions may also be submitted using DA Form 1045 (Army Ideas for Excellence Program (AIEP) Proposal).

Contents

Chapter 1
Introduction

1-1. Purpose. This concept outlines the capabilities the Army requires to conduct joint, interagency, and combined or coalition early entry operations in support of missions requiring the projection of U.S. forces across the range of military operations.

1-2. References.

a. FM 100-5 (Operations).

b. TRADOC Reg 11-16 (Developing and Managing Concepts).

c. TRADOC Pam 525-5 (Full Dimensional Operations) (To be published.)

d. Vision of Future Battle, 23 Sep 93.

e. Force Projection Concept, 1 Oct 92.

f. "Boathouse Gang II," May 92.

1-3. Explanation of abbreviations and terms. Abbreviations and special terms used in this concept are explained in the glossary.

Chapter 2
Overview

2-1. Why the concept is needed. To support the National Military Strategy (NMS) the Army must possess the capability to rapidly deploy and insert "first to fight" forces that are lethal and survivable.

2-2. Assumptions.

a. Threat. With the end of the Cold War, regional disputes, formerly kept in check by superpower rivalry and restraint, have evolved into potentially dangerous confrontations. Many regional powers now have, or could rapidly procure, formidable modernized armed forces, including the latest generation weapons systems. These regional powers could form coalitions among themselves to become a formidable force. Some are hostile to the U.S. and its friends and allies and are located in areas where they could threaten vital U.S. interests. Yet, there are few, if any, U.S. forces permanently positioned ashore in many of those areas.

b. Operation Desert Shield/Storm exposed the vulnerabilities of our "first to arrive," lightly equipped

contingency forces to a threat equipped with heavy armor. Our armored forces, while survivable and lethal, are heavy, large, and cumbersome to transport in a time sensitive environment. It is certain that potential future enemies closely observed recent operations involving the projection of U.S. military forces and in the future could seek to exploit U.S. vulnerabilities, including perceived inadequate early entry force lethality and survivability. The future Army must have the capability to conduct early entry operations with tailored armored, light and special operations forces that are more deployable, lethal, survivable, and sustainable.

c. Joint, coalition or combined, and interagency operations.

(1) Joint operations. Missions that require the projection of Army forces are intrinsically joint operations. Joint force interoperability is therefore especially crucial to the success of early entry forces, which must be able to use and integrate national intelligence systems linked into joint command, control, and communication systems, and function effectively with forces from all services. Depending on the operational environment, joint force capabilities may have to initially compensate for ground combat power shortfalls. During peacetime, the Army must properly train, structure and equip its units to prepare for early entry operations in support of the projection of U.S. forces. Joint training is essential and requires established Department of Defense (DoD) and Armywide standards for readiness and deployment. This training must be conducted outside continental United States (OCONUS) in likely areas of conflict to demonstrate U.S. capabilities and familiarization with and adjustment to the geography, climate, food, water, languages, and cultures of the area. Classroom and simulation based training, such as BCTP, must also focus on joint early entry operations.

(2) Combined or coalition operations. Missions requiring the projection of force will normally involve operations with forces from allied or friendly nations. United States early entry forces must be interoperable with these forces. Combined or coalition interoperability seeks to retain the strengths and minimize the weaknesses of all combined or coalition members, preserving in the process each nation's vital contributions to the overall operation. It usually requires, at a minimum, compatible operational and tactical level doctrine and the ability to communicate with all forces.

(3) Interagency operations. Interagency operations may require support from the Army's early entry forces. Army forces may operate under civilian control and authority in achieving objectives associated with the economic, political, and informational elements of national power.

d. Initial logistic support in theater will probably be bare based and lack required infrastructure. Early entry logistics must be as agile as the combat forces they sustain and provide multidimensional support regardless of operation type or maturity of theater. If possible, pre-crisis preparation to include agreements, nation-assistance, exercises (joint/combined), and equipment interoperability exchanges can markedly enhance the ability to sustain early entry forces in the future operations.

e. Strategic lift and preposition.

(1) Strategic lift. In time-critical crisis, the absence of a close link between strategic lift capabilities and deploying force will hamper or disrupt deployment. Close coordination is a must to ensure a smooth deployment. Air Force and Army commanders must identify lift availability and priorities to ensure proper elements are efficiently and rapidly deployed by air to the area of operation.

(2) Prepositioning. Refocusing the Army from large forward deployed forces to much smaller forward presence units in selected locations and force projection requires prepositioning heavy combat force's equipment in strategic locations for flexibility. Prepositioned ships are logical and highly valuable in complementing or following early entry forces. "Heavy assets" close to the area of operations will increase the lethality and survivability of early entry forces. Close coordination is required to assure arrival of assets prepositioned on ships is synchronized closely with the arrival of lighter early entry forces deployed by air. This synchronization allows for the rapid build-up of a highly lethal and survivable early entry force composed of both light and heavy assets.

Chapter 3
Concept

3-1. Overview. Early entry forces are those operational deploying forces required to support the Commander in Chief's (CINC) or other Joint Force Commander's (JFC) concept of operations in a pre-crisis or crisis situation. Early entry forces must possess capabilities to deploy rapidly, enter the operational area, secure the lodgement, and either immediately have decisive effect or create conditions for the arrival of substantial follow on forces that then conduct decisive operations. Early entry forces must consist of lethal and survivable units tailored to support or carry out the operational intent of the JFC.

3-2. Concept description.

a. Early entry is highly situational dependent and may occur across the range of military operations. Early entry can be categorized into three types: unopposed entry when no combat is taking place, unopposed entry under combat conditions, and forcible entry.

(1) Unopposed entry when no combat is taking place. In this situation the intent of early entry force may be to serve as a deterrent, to act as the advanced detachment for a much larger deployment that will follow, or to participate in non-combat operations such

as disaster relief or humanitarian assistance. The composition of the early entry force will depend on a careful mission, enemy, terrain, troops, and time available (METT-T) analysis prior to deployment sequencing. In some cases, even though combat is not expected, the composition of the early entry force must include combat and combat support elements to provide protection against this possibility, however remote.

(2) Unopposed entry under combat conditions. In this case the early entry force is deploying units into the area of operations where combat is underway, or imminent, but where the ports and airfields are under friendly control. The composition of the early entry force may vary widely depending on the situation. For example, if the Host Nation armed forces are on the verge of being overwhelmed, U.S. early entry forces may include maneuver units that can control terrain and prevent the enemy from seizing ports of debarkation. However, if the Host Nation's armed forces are conducting effective resistance but lack deep attack capabilities such as sensors and attack systems, early entry forces may require tailoring to satisfy that need. Each situation is different and will require force tailoring based on METT-T considerations.

(3) Forcible entry. Forcible entry is the riskiest type of early entry. The early entry force is designed to either

(a) Secure a lodgement for the subsequent arrival of larger forces that will conduct decisive operations or

(b) Immediately have decisive effect by collapsing the enemy's center of gravity and accomplishing the mission.

In either case, the early entry force will consist predominately of maneuver units.

b. Early entry operations. Early entry is a subset of operations involving the initial deploying forces They occur whenever missions require the projection of U.S. forces from CONUS or elsewhere. This section describes early entry in the context of the first five phases of force projection operations: pre-deployment activities, mobilization, deployment, entry and decisive operations. These force projection operations often overlap in space and time and are not distinct, requiring commanders and units to deal with them simultaneously and/or sequentially. Force projection operations seldom begin with a clear identification of what the entire force package will be, or even with the ultimate purpose clearly in focus. Nonetheless, it helps to conceptualize a logical flow from phase to phase, as long as the force remains physically and mentally prepared to adjust as the operation evolves.

(1) Pre-deployment activities.

(a) Following receipt of a mission requiring projection of U.S. forces, commanders must conduct mission analysis and force preparation. They must determine command structure and correct mix of forces and arrival sequence in the area of operations. Army forces identified for early deployment must have battle plans prepared in anticipation of CINC requirements to maximize available planning time. As deployment nears, timely, theater specific intelligence and predictive operational and logistical data must flow directly to deploying early entry units. During mission analysis, early entry force commander is greatly dependent on national, joint and space-based systems such as TENCAP, the U2, and other satellite based mapping capabilities to properly complete the intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB). Information provided from these sources will assist in the force tailoring for in-theater operations.

(b) A major aspect to early entry forces is the development and promulgation of Rules of Engagement (ROE). ROE are the most important legal consideration for early entry forces. ROE have a direct and major effect on operations. The JFC and component commanders may also issue general orders pertaining to the conduct of forces under their command. These general orders have significant individual impact and may be an absolute necessity in nations with dissimilar cultures.

(2) Mobilization. Crisis response may consist primarily of active Army early entry forces. Developing METT-T may require the mobilization of resources to handle unique situations and requirements resulting from the crisis. This mobilization may include activating all or part of the Reserve Components as well as assembling and organizing personnel, supplies and materiel. When Reserve Component units are mobilized under these circumstances they may include combat forces or, more likely, support forces, such as port, airfield, medical, line haul, and maintenance units. To maintain quick response time, consistent with the new NMS, select Reserve elements may require higher levels of deployment readiness status.

(3) Deployment (Deploy the Force).

(a) Carefully tailoring early entry forces to the situation at hand requires consideration of METT-T, available strategic lift, the capabilities of the joint, combined and host nation forces, and facilities in theater. In a time-critical crisis, light and ARSOF units may be the appropriate forces for initial deployment. Depending on strategic lift availability, priorities, and criticality of the situation, small armored and mechanized elements may require deployment by air. The need for rapid deployment of combat configured units will initially take priority over maximizing the efficient use of lift. While light forces are initially deploying, armored forces can be simultaneously uploaded for deployment by fast sealift, or drawn from prepositioned stocks or from afloat pre-positioned ship equipment/supplies. Figure 3-1 describes a rigorous standard for the deployment of an Army Corps, and its organic support, within 75 days of receipt of a deployment order. The future Army must meet or exceed this standard by enhancing training, deployment capabilities, and restructuring organizations.

THE ARMY DEPLOYMENT STANDARD

The Army must provide a Corps of five divisions, that is tailorable, sustainable, and with airborne, vertical insertion capability. The lead brigade must be on the ground by C+4, the lead division by C+12. Two heavy divisions (sealifted) arrive from CONUS by C+30 (armored, mechanized, or air assault). The full corps (five divisions and a COSCOM) close by C+75. A fully supported heavy combat brigade, with sufficient supplies to sustain the Corps until lines of communication are established, must be prepositioned afloat. (The Army Strategic Mobility Program, HQDA)

Figure 3-1. Deployment Standard

(b) A continuous and rapid build-up of friendly combat power is critical to early entry operations. The objective is to achieve overwhelming superiority and to set the preconditions necessary to win decisively. During this rapid build-up, it is important to conduct or continue civil affairs operations with the host country and to rapidly assemble and protect essential logistics support capabilities for early entry follow-on forces.

(c) Early entry tactical forces must have enroute, space based, communications for mission refinement, change and continuous intelligence update. In theater, these same communications will enable linkage to senior commanders and to support management/ processing elements that may remain in CONUS. JFC must take advantage of national and joint systems to monitor activities within the area of operations such as JSTARS, AWACS, Air Force/USN Recce, SOF, or new systems. Trained, predesignated liaison teams must deploy early to establish continual and effective interaction among all forces. These teams are essential for coordinating operational, intelligence and logistics matters.

(d) Deployment of appropriate tactical and operational-level headquarter elements must occur quickly and, in many contingencies, concurrently. Collocation of major component headquarters together with the Joint Task Force (JTF) headquarters will facilitate joint planing and integration. Where actual collocation is not feasible, component headquarters should dispatch a robust and capable liaison and planning element to the JTF headquarters. A proper mix of headquarter elements facilitates current operations, future planning and coordination with host nation and allied forces, and the reception and employment of follow-on reinforcing units. The early presence of an operational level headquarters allows tactical commanders to focus on employing their forces. Throughout the deployment, all commanders must maintain the flexibility to reconfigure units and adjust deployment schedules to adapt to changing requirements or lift availability.

(4) Entry (Secure the Initial Lodgement Area).

(a) Early entry forces must be prepared for simultaneous deployment and employment. This will require that, at a minimum, they have the capability to seize and control the lodgement, develop the theater and, to the extent possible, establish the preconditions for decisive operations. In a combat situation early entry forces may initially be outnumbered, requiring them to task organize and echelon to arrive in the area of operations in a sequence appropriate to the combat situation. Joint cooperation with United States Air Force (USAF), United States Navy (USN), and United States Marine Corp (USMC) elements is critical. It is vital to achieve local air superiority around airfields and ports. As the operation progresses early entry forces must introduce and integrate systems to kill deep. Increased battle space allows early entry forces to destroy and disrupt enemy forces before becoming decisively engaged. Introduction of heavy forces as soon as possible will assist in achieving the overwhelming combat power (maneuver, firepower, and mobility/ countermobility) needed to win decisively in the next phase of the operation. To more rapidly introduce heavy forces, commanders must have at their disposal assets prepositioned afloat near the area of operations. The objective during the early entry phase is to quickly integrate all elements of combat power and to disrupt or destroy the enemy force ensuring survivability of the early entry force and promoting success of the overall operations.

(b) In the event combat has not yet begun, entry may entail gaining positional and/or political advantage or building up overwhelming force to deter a potential aggressor. Even if the strategic intent is to deter an opponent, the operational focus must be on seizing the initiative and creating an offensive capability to fight and win should deterrence fail.

(c) Protect the force. In either situation, combat or not, early entry forces must protect themselves from enemy small arms, mines, direct fire, biological/chemical attack, artillery, tactical ballistic missiles (TBMs), air, terrorism, and, possibly, an unfriendly populace.

(5) Decisive operations. Under many circumstances, early entry operations conclude prior to the conduct of decisive operations. However, early entry forces could engage in decisive operations immediately to accomplish the mission, in effect conducting a coup de main. These operations are intended to produce an immediate, decisive effect. In these circumstances, early entry forces seek to rapidly collapse the enemy's center of gravity, then achieving the desired end-state of the operation simultaneously with deployment of forces. They will include predominantly combat forces with only a relatively limited sustainment capability. These operations require extensive planning and rehearsing.

3-3. Required capabilities.

a. Deployability.

(1) Early entry force deployment, employment, and sustainment are closely interrelated, and these capabilities must be developed simultaneously. Deployability is essential for all units: armored, light, Special Operation Force (SOF), combat, combat support, and combat service support. Deployability of early entry forces is based on a number of factors, among which are training and readiness, equipment characteristics, proximity to ports of embarkation, and force design that facilitates force tailoring during the projection of U.S. forces.

(2) Early entry forces require "real-time" joint communications tailored for rapid deployment capable of linking strategic through tactical levels of communications. Deploying early entry units require home station, enroute, and in-theater communications that are secure, reliable, flexible and deployable. Assured communications is the key. These communications systems must be capable of interoperablity with joint forces, civilian agencies, and combined or coalition forces. They must have the ability to support multiple, continuous intelligence links to the deployed force home station, major Army commands (MACOM), and national intelligence agencies. Early entry forces are highly dependent on CONUS based intelligence, and must have redundant communications to numerous agencies.

(3) Deployability must be a mindset. Early entry forces will deploy only absolutely required capabilities of communications and logistic systems with the utmost confidence in them from the commanders.

b. Lethality. A key requirement for early entry forces is a high degree of lethality. Lethality involves more than simply maneuver and the application of firepower. Lethality is obtained from the synergism of force agility, technologically superior weapons, sound doctrine and realistic training emphasizing the integration and synchronization of total force capabilities to achieve maximum combat power. Future materiel developments must strive to increase lethality of early entry forces while decreasing the size, weight, cube, and consumption rates of systems. Lethality is also a function of using and maximizing the capabilities of all services. This joint force synergism can compensate for an initial lack of ground combat power. The JFC must maximize the synergy of Army, Air Force, Navy, Marine Corps, SOF, Coast Guard, host nation, and allied forces for successful early entry operations.

c. Survivability. Early entry forces, to remain survivable, must have the capability to rapidly expand battle space in all dimensions, including time, against a potentially formidable armored force. To help achieve this, rapid joint force capability synchronization is required to maintain defense against enemy TBMs, achieve local air superiority and rapidly secure LOCs. Properly packaging early entry forces, their weapons and support systems, and their ability to synchronize strikes/targets at depth will increase their survivability. Improving agility and lethality of rapidly deployable early entry forces and enhancing space-based systems will also contribute to their protection and survivability.

d. Sustainability. The nature of the early entry logistical challenge in support of the JFC's concept of operations will vary with the size of the early entry force, the maturity of the theater, the availability of the in-theater stockage and host nation support (HNS) capabilities. Early entry operations may require the ability to leverage space systems, develop forward support bases, intermediate staging bases and/or a lodgement in the theater with its associated over-the-shore or air flow requirements. The Army must continue to reduce logistical demands significantly through the use of enhanced distribution and automation technologies. Efficiencies in logistics support may require split based operations to adequately sustain early entry forces. The JFC and senior Army commanders must conduct a logistics preparation of the battlefield to achieve the most effective mix of HNS, contractor and military CSS to reduce demands on military lift and other resources. Preparations completed during pre-crisis activities to include agreements, nation-assistance, exercises (joint/combined), and equipment interoperability exchanges can markedly enhance the ability to sustain early entry forces in future operations.

Appendix A
Implications (DTLOMS)

A-1. Doctrine. Army and joint doctrine must stress that all services, not just specialized organizations (SOF, airborne, or other light forces), must have the ability to conduct early entry operations. Doctrine must provide common, unifying terminology and establish procedures that will facilitate task organizing, echeloning, and tailoring early entry forces from widely separated geographic areas. Army doctrine must emphasize the joint and combined nature of early entry operations and be linked to and consistent with emerging joint doctrine.

A-2. Training.

a. Early entry forces require standardized, realistic joint and combined training programs to develop effective rapid deployment capabilities at all levels. Units must continually train to operate in coordination with elements of the other services, agencies and nations. Joint and combined training will ensure adequate knowledge of tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) of the other services or countries. Army units must coordinate training and readiness cycles with key elements of the other services and allied/coalition forces. Training to deploy (emergency readiness deployment exercises) using Air Force, Navy, or commercial strategic lift must be continually emphasized in Army units, e.g., training for tactical loading for debarkation "ready to fight." Training forces for early entry operations should routinely cycle through regional reception and staging bases for the purpose of familiarization with and adjustment to the geography, climate, food, water, languages, and culture of the area.

b. Training is particularly important in the establishment of an intermediate headquarters. Consideration should be given to "Battle Rostering" TDA organizations as intermediate headquarters that can conduct peacetime training to refine skills critical to supporting early entry operations.

A-3. Leader development. Early entry operations require Army leaders who are tactically proficient employing combined arms forces across the continuum of military operations and in a variety of environments. They must possess the mental agility to rapidly adapt to all situations. These leaders must ensure their units are ready to deploy virtually anywhere, at any time, in different mixes and combinations, for varying purposes, in war and operations other than war. Leaders at appropriate levels of command must be knowledgeable of the challenges of joint, interagency, and combined or coalition operations.

A-4. Organization. The ability to tailor early entry forces is essential. Force tailoring is the process of reconfiguring task organized and echeloned units following receipt of a mission to deploy. Force tailoring occurs after the identification of METT-T, strategic lift, prepositioned assets and HNS. Commanders tailor their units to meet the demands of the CINC's concept of operations. A key consideration is to select the appropriate force mix for the mission, and then to sequence the flow of those forces to permit simultaneous deployment, employment and sustainment. Early entry planning must investigate ways to improve the ability to force tailor expeditiously without confusion to handle the mission assigned. Commanders and staffs must focus on improving mobility, lethality and survivability of each unit as they are reorganized. This will include planning for split based operations to allow for efficiencies in deployment, battle command, and sustainment.

A-5. Materiel.

a. The Army must continue to exploit technological opportunities to design and field more capable weapons and support systems to compensate for the fact that early entry forces may be required to fight and win while outnumbered in an austere environment. Specifically, the Army must—

(1) Design interoperability with Navy, Marine, and Air Force systems into all equipment.

(2) Reduce manpower requirements through automation.

(3) Enhance situational awareness of the battle through advanced battle management/battle command techniques that are flexible and deployable for early entry operations. Ensure long range-communications, and assure connectivity and reliable communications at every level and across combat, combat support, and combat service support organizations.

(4) Enhance weapons and sensor connectivity using advanced data links.

(5) Provide longer range, quicker, more accurate target acquisition capabilities to expand battle space rapidly during early entry operations.

(6) Employ unmanned systems capable of detecting and engaging enemy targets.

(7) Enhance counter-recon capabilities against a wide array of possible enemy (aerial) RISTA platforms such as UAVs/ RPVs/drones to recon helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft up to satellite platforms.

(8) Enhance defense capabilities against missiles, attack/armed helicopters and fixed wing aircraft.

(9) Design simplicity of use, reliability, availability, and maintainability into all systems.

(10) Reduce the work load of the individual combat soldier.

(11) Employ smart and brilliant weapons in the close battle.

b. The Army must balance the need for increasingly more lethal and survivable forces with the need for greater deployability. Lighter early entry forces must be more lethal and survivable, extending the battle space over which they will dominate enemy forces, even heavily armored forces. Early entry forces must be more

deployable, reducing lift required to rapidly project them worldwide, without sacrificing lethality and survivability. Improving the self-deployment capabilities of Army aviation units will also contribute to enhancing the lethality of early entry forces and simultaneously reduce the burden on strategic lift.

c. The Army must ensure early entry forces possess effective joint combat identification, friend or foe (IFF) systems on both organic and non-organic equipment.

d. The Army must develop new and improved methods to protect and maintain visibility of soldiers, supplies, materiel, and unit equipment during movement.

e. The Army must design equipment to operate more efficiently. Reducing fuel and maintenance requirements will assist in decreasing logistical support requirements for early entry forces. Maintenance must be reduced to its simplest level.

f. The Army must continually articulate and be willing to fund the necessary strategic lift. An adequate mix of strategic air and sea lift is a prerequisite for the Army to rapidly deploy a mix of forces to conduct early entry operations and support our NMS.

Glossary

Section I
Abbreviations

CINC	Commander in Chief
CONUS	Continental United States
DoD	Department of Defense
DTLOMS	doctrine, training, leader development, organization, materiel, and soldiers
HNS	host nation support
IPB	intelligence preparation of the battlefield
IFF	identification friendly or foe
JFC	Joint Force Commander
JTF	Joint Task Force
LOC	lines of communication
MACOM	major Army command
METT-T	mission, enemy, troops, terrain and time available
NMS	National Military Strategy
OCONUS	outside continental United States
OOTW	operations other than war
ROE	Rules of Engagement
RISTA	Reconnaissance, Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition
SOF	Special Operations Force
TBM	tactical ballistic missile
TTP	tactics, techniques, and procedures
USAF	United States Air Force
USMC	United States Marine Corps
USN	United States Navy

Section II
Terms

Battle Dynamic
Future American military operations will be characterized by change in five major interrelated areas known as battle dynamics: battle command, battle space, depth and simultaneous attack, early entry, and combat service support.

Battle space
Components determined by the maximum capabilities of units to acquire and dominate the enemy; includes area beyond the AO; it varies over time according to how the commander positions his assets.

Full Dimensional Operations
The application of all capabilities available to an Army commander to accomplish his mission decisively and at the least cost across the full range of possible operations.

Force Projection
The movement of military forces from CONUS or a theater in response to requirements for war or operations other than war. Force-projection operations extend from mobilization and deployment of forces, to redeployment to CONU.S. or home theater, to subsequent demobilization.

Operation Other than War
Military activities during peacetime and conflict that do not necessarily involve armed clashes between two organized forces.

Port of Debarkation
An aerial or seaport within the theater of operations where the strategic transportation of forces is completed; it may not be the force's final destination.

Port of Embarkation
An air or sea terminal at which troops, units, military-sponsored personnel, unit equipment, and materiel are boarded or loaded.

Rules of Engagement
Directives issued by competent military authority that delineates the circumstances and limitations under which U.S. forces will initiate and/or continue combat engagement with other encountered forces.

Split Based Logistics
Dividing logistics management functions so that only those functions absolutely necessary are deployed, allowing some management functions to be accomplished from CONUS or other theater.

Synchronization
The ability to focus resources and activities in time and space to produce maximum relative combat power at the decisive point.

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